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ABSTRACT

OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES AND FINANCING OPTIONS FOR SOLAR ENERGY
GENERATION IN HUMBOLDT COUNTY

Mahayla Slackerelli

Ownership structures and financing sources for photovoltaic (PV) solar arrays
have a large effect on the economic feasibility of a project. This thesis examines potential
ownership structure and financing combinations for a one-megawatt PV solar array in
Humboldt County. The options deemed suitable for the context of the project are
discussed qualitatively. A subset of the financing options and ownership structures are
modeled using the National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s System Advisory Model to
gauge their economic viability.
Access to the Investment Tax Credit (ITC) and other tax advantages are the most
crucial variables for a competitive solar array. Not all ownership structures can harness
the assistance of the ITC; selecting an ownership structure that can is likely to result in
the least expensive energy, even with higher cost financing options. Due to sunsetting tax
benefits, beginning a project by the end of 2018 gives it an economic advantage from
which later projects are not forecasted to benefit.
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INTRODUCTION

The landscape of the electricity sector in Humboldt County has been upended. In
May of 2017, Redwood Coast Energy Authority’s (RCEA) Community Choice Energy
program took over the procurement of energy for most customers in Humboldt County.
With this restructuring, RCEA has pursued an electricity procurement policy with the
intention of better representing the values of the community (Redwood Coast Energy
Authority, 2016). The key tenets of this policy are renewable energy utilization and local
economic development.
While biomass generation has been the staple of renewable energy in Humboldt,
RCEA is interested in procuring a variety of local renewable energy types (Schatz Energy
Research Center, 2013). In the power provider’s founding documents, they expressed
particular interest in developing solar energy generation in the local area. RCEA set a
goal to procure five megawatts of local solar by 2018 and intends to contract for 15
megawatts of local solar within the first five years of operation (Redwood Coast Energy
Authority, 2016).
Unfortunately, the solar resource in Humboldt County is not as strong as other
parts of the state (See Figure 1). All else being equal, the cost of electricity will be more
expensive than solar power from sunnier regions, so the choice of financing and
ownership structures will be particularly important in making solar projects feasible.
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Figure 1. A heat map of the photovoltaic resource in California (NREL, 2017b).
Ownership structures in the solar industry vary due to the values of the
community, access to governmental incentives, and to accommodate the needs of the
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owner. In this thesis I compare tested forms of ownership structures against each other to
determine which features of each may offer most economic advantage in the context of
Humboldt County. It also explores the different, available financing options.
In this project different ownership structure and finance source combinations for a
utility-scale solar array in Humboldt County are compared qualitatively and
quantitatively. Some of the discussed ownership structures are modeled using a
standardized hypothetical one-megawatt array to properly contrast advantages and
disadvantages of the structures to produce economic outputs for comparison. The
ownership structures are combined with some of the financing sources discussed in this
project to better understand the options for a solar array in Humboldt County. Together
those two elements make up the crucial variables of this projects quantitative analysis.
This project does not attempt to provide an exhaustive list of financial and
ownership structure options for solar generation. Rather, it focuses on those options that
seem to fit RCEA and Humboldt County’s context best. This project examines the
ownership structures most likely to result in reasonable levelized cost of energy rates for
a solar project in Humboldt County.
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BACKGROUND

In order to contextualize this project, this section introduces the environmental
motivations for building and procuring solar energy, the history and priorities of CCAs in
general and RCEA in particular, and the background of Feed in Tariff (FIT) programs.
While RCEA does not have a FIT program, other CCAs have such programs, and they
are used in this project’s quantitative analysis.
Environmental Motivation

The Fifth Assessment from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) reported that anthropogenic climate change is “extremely likely” and that half of
the observed increase in global temperature can be linked back to human activity (IPCC,
2014). According to the Environmental Protection Agency, electricity generation
accounts for the largest share, 29%, of greenhouse gas emissions from national economic
activity (EPA, 2017). There are a number of different strategies for reducing carbon
emissions from electricity generation. Reducing the carbon intensity of electricity
generation could significantly bolster climate change mitigation efforts.
Redwood Coast Energy Authority

RCEA is a joint powers authority of Humboldt County (Redwood Coast Energy
Authority, 2017). A joint powers authority is formed when public agencies come together
to create a new public entity to work on a shared cause. This may occur when public
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agencies would like to address an issue, but they are individually too small to have a
dedicated department working on the topic (Cypher and Grinnel, 2006). RCEA was
formed by the cities of Arcata, Blue Lake, Eureka, Ferndale, Fortuna, Rio Dell, Trinidad,
the County of Humboldt, and the Humboldt Bay Municipal Water District to address
energy efficiency, sustainability, security and affordability in the local area (Redwood
Coast Energy Authority, 2017). RCEA’s original joint powers agreement was formed in
2003 (Redwood Coast Energy Authority, 2015). In 2015, the joint powers agreement was
amended to incorporate the community choice aggregation program.
Community Choice Energy

Community Choice Aggregation (CCA) is disrupting the traditional electricity
procurement systems in California. While it has been used in other states for some time,
the nature and utility of CCAs is transformative in its current usage in California. As the
name suggests, CCAs are meant to give communities greater control over the values
guiding their power utilities. In California the power of CCAs is being harnessed to
decrease the carbon density of the power grid (Lean Energy US, 2017).
CCAs allow communities to take over the task and responsibility of sourcing
energy from the utility. While the incumbent utility continues to maintain the physical
infrastructure of the local energy system, the CCA procures power and sets generation
rates for customers like a municipal utility. In this way, CCAs have elements of investor
owned utilities and municipal utilities (See Figure 2). CCAs can capitalize on the existing
infrastructure while freeing their constituents from the profit motive of investor owned
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utilities (Lean Energy US, 2017). CCAs typically represent a given community, but their
territory may not always be contiguous as local governing bodies must opt in to the
arrangement.

Figure 2. CCAs represent a hybrid of municipal utilities and investor owned utilities.
They have components from each model (Mow, 2017).

CCAs are designed to continuously give constituents options. After a community
has chosen to enroll in the local CCA, customers are able to opt out of the program at any
time and continue sourcing their power from the incumbent utility. In addition, many of
the CCAs in California offer different renewable energy mix options with corresponding
rates to their customers.
Massachusetts introduced the first CCA enabling legislation in 1997. Since then,
seven states in total have sanctioned CCAs (Lean Energy, 2017). The focus of the
individual CCAs throughout the country is dependent on the values of the community it
serves and the regulatory climate in which it operates.
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In 2002 Assembly Bill 117 granted public agencies the ability to form CCAs in
California. Since then CCAs have been gathering momentum throughout the state. There
are currently eight CCAs operating in California, with an additional 23 communities in
the process of launching their own (Lean Energy US, 2017) (See Figure 3). That list now
includes Humboldt County, which launched a local CCA in May of 2017. The Joint
Powers Authority, Redwood Coast Energy Authority, is the driving force behind the local
CCA. Like the other California CCAs, RCEA is invested in reaching higher levels of
renewable energy in their power mix than the State’s power portfolio. While the existing
utility, PG&E, is on track to meet California’s renewable portfolio standards, RCEA
intends to always exceed PG&E’s renewables percentage by at least 5% (Redwood Coast
Energy Authority, 2016).

Figure 3. Community Choice Aggregations in California in different launch stages (Lean
Energy US, 2017)
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In addition to environmental goals, RCEA is committed to supporting local
energy sources. Economic concerns are a large motivator for the community and
subsequently RCEA (Redwood Coast Energy Authority, 2017). There is a substantial
environmentally oriented base in Humboldt County, that would welcome renewable
technology even if that meant paying a premium. There are other segments of the
community that are more focused on economic development. So, any plan regarding a
subject as broad as energy must fully address economic concerns, as well.
Feed-in Tariff

A Feed-in Tariff (FIT) program allows a utility to offer a set rate for energy sales
that match their criteria (DiGiorgio, 2017). FIT programs create a market for renewable
energy producers that may not otherwise be able join the power generation industry.
Small-scale developers can get better access to financing with the guaranteed income
through FIT programs. Some programs like Sonoma Clean Power (SCP) offer a base FIT
rate and in addition, offer incentives for desirable characteristics like building on
previously developed sites or using local developers (Sonoma Clean Power, 2017).
As yet, RCEA does not have a FIT program, although their implementation plan
indicates an interest in creating one (Redwood Coast Energy Authority, 2016). Given the
small capacity solar PV system that this thesis is analyzing (i.e. one megawatt installed
capacity), it is likely that these projects would be subject to RCEA’s FIT. It is therefore
worth considering how these models would function within a FIT program.
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In accordance with current California law, utilities can use the FIT mechanisms to
source renewable energy from producers up to three megawatts in capacity (California
Public Utilities Commission, 2017). However, individual utilities may set tighter limits
for generation capacity. For example, SCP only allows FIT generation up to one
megawatt (Sonoma Clean Power, 2017). RCEA’s Implementation Plan indicates an
interest in a FIT program for projects less than one-megawatt in capacity (Redwood
Coast Energy Authority, 2016). FIT programs offer rates for renewable energy that are
generally higher than the market prices. Restrictions for energy generation in FIT
programs protect the utility from contracting for too much expensive energy, while still
allowing some generators to enjoy the benefits of guaranteed rates (U.S. Energy
Information Administration, 2013).
FIT programs can set their own rates for potential producers. While the rates are
set, there is often a range depending on the circumstances of the energy generation. For
example, SCE has a base rate of 9.5 ¢/kWh but offers up to 13 ¢/kWh for producers that
meet certain desirable qualifications (Sonoma Clean Power, 2017). MCE offers FIT rates
between 9 and 11.5 ¢/kWh depending on if the energy is intermittent, baseload, or peak
(Marin Clean Energy, 2017).
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OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES AND FINANCING

This project focuses on two elements of planning a solar array: the ownership
structure and the source of financing. These two pieces of the project are some of the
most crucial and controllable variables of the financial viability of an array. The
ownership structure dictates who is responsible for contributing resources at set times,
what benefits the project will gain, who enjoys them and who is liable if the project goes
awry. A single organization could potentially play all the roles, but two or more parties
are often involved in the construction and operation of a solar array.
There are a number of sources for project-length financing, and the terms of the
loans have a significant impact on the economic feasibility of the project. This thesis
explores several common and non-traditional sources of financing. The financing
estimates are combined with the ownership scenarios to better understand how they
function jointly.
Tax Incentives

The defining feature of many of the ownership structures discussed below is their
relationship with tax incentives. In fact, many of them would not exist without the
promise of tax incentives. There are different aspects of tax credits that inform
ownership structures.
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Investment Tax Credit
The investment tax credit (ITC) is a federal program to subsidize the solar
industry. The tax credit applies to residential systems as well as commercial and utility
scale solar generation. It provides a 30% tax credit for projects started by 2019 (See
Figure 4). In the current iteration, the credit wanes until 2022 when the residential portion
concludes and the commercial and utility scale credit will remain at a constant 10%
subsidy (EnergySage, 2016). However, the Congress has extended the ITC multiple times
in the past.

Figure 4. Investment Tax Credit extended schedule through 2022 (EnergySage, 2016).
The 30% tax credit has been a substantial boon to the solar industry. Solar
installation has grown by 1600% since the enactment of the ITC in 2006 (Solar Energy
Industries Association, 2017). Much of the structuring of solar projects must focus on
capturing the ITC to be competitive. However, tax credits create more complications than
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a cash subsidy. An entity must have a significant amount of tax liability to capture the
entire credit. Unlike the Earned Income Tax Credit, the ITC is non-refundable, meaning
if an entity has less tax liability than the total potential tax credit the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) will not send a check for the remainder; only an entity with tax liability as
large as the project’s ITC can harvest the full benefits. On the residential side, this means
that low income households do not have equal access to these government subsidies
(Davis, 2015). In the commercial and utility scale market, the same dynamic is at play.
Governmental bodies, NGOs and smaller private companies cannot access the benefits of
a tax incentive on their own. They must forgo the credit or partner with a larger for-profit
business that can use a tax shield (Mendelsohn et al., 2012). There are a number of
different ways to structure these partnerships. The various partnerships structures are
expanded upon in the Tax Equity section.
The tax credit does not have to be used exclusively in the year the project was
started. Remaining tax credits may be applied to the previous year or to the next 20 years’
taxes (Solar Outreach, 2015). However, spreading the subsidy out over such a long period
of time reduces the benefit’s usefulness in the short term (Mendelsohn and Kreycik,
2012). This can be a crucial issue since solar projects have large upfront costs and no fuel
costs. The economic principle of the time value of money says that money is worth more
the sooner it is received (Carther, 2017). Decreasing the high upfront costs or at least
spreading them out over the course of the lifetime of the project, through financing,
makes a project more economically feasible.

13
Accelerated and Bonus Depreciation
In addition to the ITC, qualified photovoltaic (PV) projects are eligible for tax
depreciation benefits. The Modified Accelerated Cost-Recovery System (MACRS)
allows a company building a solar array to depreciate their assets, reducing their taxable
income, more quickly (Solar Outreach, 2015). Rather than the project depreciating over
its full lifetime, it has a five-year depreciation schedule (See Figure 5). This is a
particularly powerful benefit in the solar industry because the lifetime costs of projects
are concentrated in the initial stages.

Figure 5. A comparison of MACRS, bonus MACRS and 20-year linear depreciation over
the first six years of a project (Mendelsohn and Kreycik, 2012).

In addition to accelerated tax depreciation, the federal government also offers
bonus depreciation, which allows controlling companies to depreciate 50% of the assets
of the PV project in the first year (Lutton and You, 2017). However, under the current
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schedule this benefit will begin diminishing after 2017. In 2018 there will still be a bonus
depreciation of 40% and in 2019 the rate will be 30%. In 2020 the bonus depreciation
benefit expires (Lutton and You, 2017).
Harnessing all three of these tax incentives gives a project the opportunity to write
off up to 60% of the total installed cost of the system (Mendelsohn et al, 2012).
Considering low prices from other traditional energy sources, these incentives allow solar
projects to be competitive in the market.
Fair Market Value
Another crucial tax issue is determining the fair market price for the project. This
is hugely important for the ITC because it determines the total from which the 30% tax
credit is calculated. If the project is bought and sold, establishing the fair market value is
straight forward. However, if the project does not change hands, the Treasury Department
will accept three different methods of determining the fair market value. The value must
be established by predicting future income from the project, costing out all the system’s
components or using a similar project as a proxy (Treasury Department, n.d.). The
Treasury department does not prefer the future income approach because it allows for a
broad range of estimates based on discount rates, inflation and the future economic
environment. Generally, the Treasury department prefers that a project establishes its fair
market value based on the actual costs of building the project. However, using the costing
technique is somewhat open ended, because the developer’s markup is an intangible cost
that could be exaggerated; a reasonable reported profit is 10% to 20%, and the
developer’s fee is expected to be between 3% and 20% (Lutton and You, 2017). The third
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technique, using a similar project as a proxy, could be difficult for an array in Humboldt
County because there are not many comparable projects in the area.
The solar developer’s incentive is to make the tax basis appear as large as possible
so that the tax benefits would be larger. However, inflating the cost of the project is
extremely risky because the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service
strictly evaluate these tax basis claims (Lutton and You, 2017).
In the case of a tax equity arrangement, where parties join together to reap the
benefits of tax incentives that one party would not have had access to alone, there would
be multiple players but there would not be a clear sale of the system. Many of the
scenarios presented in this thesis would requiring choosing one of the three methods to
establish fair market value.
Ownership Structures

There are only a few types of entities that can take advantage of ITC benefits. The
simplest arrangement to access the ITC is for one developer with enough tax liability to
own and operate the array and reap all the tax incentives. Many parties interested in
building solar do not have the tax liability to access the ITC on their own. Solar
developers are generally not large enough to be able to reap tax benefits alone
(Mendelsohn and Kreycik, 2012). Non-profit organizations, like RCEA, may be
motivated by environmental reasons to build solar, but by their non-profit nature they
have no tax liability. A non-profit can create a for-profit taxable subsidiary. The
subsidiary has the potential to use the tax incentives, but it would still need to be large
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enough and have enough tax liability to make the project worthwhile (Cotter, 2016). It is
unlikely that there would be such an organization in Humboldt County due to the rural
nature of the community and the scarcity of tax equity organizations. However, these
types of entities could partner with larger organizations to access the tax-based subsidies
(Lutton and You, 2017).
This section examines the different ownership structures that would allow an
entity with insufficient tax liability to still capitalize on the ITC and other characteristics
of these structures (See Table 1).
Table 1. Summary of key elements of the studied ownership structures.

Equity
Owners

Third
Party
Single Partnership
Sale
Inverted
Ownership
Commercial
Owner
Flip
Leaseback
Lease
with Stepin Rights
Tax
Tax
Tax Investor
Tax
Investor
Investor
Business
Developer
and
Investor
and
and
Owner
Developer
and Utility
Developer
Developer

Project
Level Debt

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Structure
Flexibility

High

Low

High

High

High

High

Transaction
Costs

Low

High

Mid

High

High

Low

Frequency
of Use

High

Low

Low

Low

Low

High

Access to
Muni Bonds
or CREBs

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No
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Tax Equity Structures
The tax equity financial structure was created in response to renewable energy tax
credits. Renewable energy developers rarely have enough tax liability to capture the
incentives. A tax equity flip is a partnership between at least two organizations in which
one has a sizable tax appetite to harvest the ITC. The tax equity investor is often a large
bank or an insurance firm (Mendelsohn et al, 2012).
There are multiple ways to structure these agreements. The specifics depend on
the actors involved. This section will describe the three most popular tax equity
structures: a partnership flip, a sale-leaseback, and an inverted lease. Any of the
ownership structures could potentially use a tax equity partnership to capture federal tax
incentives.
Tax equity structures are popular because they take advantage of the 30% ITC,
but the more complicated they become the higher the transaction costs. Transaction costs
in this scenario are often made up of attorney, accountant, and consultant fees. Tax equity
structures are relatively new for the solar industry (Lutton and You, 2017). They were
created for the wind energy industry. The solar market has benefited from the pioneering
work of wind energy finance (Mendelsohn et al, 2012). Still the relative scarcity of
experience with tax equity structures increases the transaction costs. High transactions
costs incentivize development of bigger projects to dilute the expense.
The first challenge of a tax equity arrangement is finding a willing investor. There
is a dearth of investors willing to enter into these arrangements. For this reason they are
often able to dictate the terms of the partnership (Lutton and You, 2017). Tax equity
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investors generally have a strong preference for investments in larger projects. Typical
investments are between $75 and $100 million (Lutton and You, 2017). RCEA’s current
ambition is to source 15 megawatts of local solar in the next five years. Even if all that
capacity were financed together, it would be much smaller than a typical tax equity
projects. That is not to say that it is not possible to use this financial structure on a
smaller scale, but it comes with the aforementioned challenges. Another option is to
aggregate the projects with other larger projects making them more attractive to
wholesale investors (Cotter, 2016).
Partnership Flip
A partnership flip is a tax equity structure, which involves at least two partners,
typically the developer and the tax equity investor. The tax equity investor is the larger
organization with a significant tax liability. The partnership is usually structured around
achieving a target internal rate of return (IRR) for the equity investor. Sometimes the
flips are structured to occur on a certain date rather than after a target IRR is achieved.
This structure can either be financed with equity or some combination of equity and debt
(Mendelsohn et al, 2012). Both parties contribute to the equity of the project. The
developer is responsible for at least 1% of the costs, and each tax equity investor is
responsible for at least 5% of the equity, according to tax law (Mendelsohn and Kreycik,
2012). In the beginning, commonly the developer receives all the revenue, or
distributable cash, until it has recouped its initial investment. The equity investor receives
the lion’s share of the tax benefits until the specified date or target IRR is reached. This
may be after the five-year period, when the majority of the tax benefits are harvested, or
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as late as nine years into the project. At that point, the income distribution flips, with the
developer getting more of the tax benefits and the equity investor taking in more of the
revenue. This structure can include multiple flips to satisfy the requirements of the
partners and can include more than two partners (Mendelsohn et al, 2012).
The tax equity partnership may run the course of the project or the tax investor
can be bought out. The developer may buy the tax equity investor out of the project once
the ITC benefits are captured. The flip is structured in such a way that the tax investor has
little stake in the project once the tax benefits are harvested, so the buyout price is
minimal (Lutton and You, 2017).
The partnership flip is one of the costlier available tax equity ownership
arrangements. The transaction costs of creating the legal partnership can run from
$250,000 to $500,000 (Cotter, 2016). Some of these costs are ongoing maintenance
requirements.
There is less flexibility in the timing of creating this partnership structure than
other tax equity arrangements; the partnership must be in place before the project is
developed because the agreed upon rates must be strictly structured to achieve the
optimal revenue (Lutton and You, 2017). According to tax law, the developer must invest
some capital into the project, which may be prohibitive for a small firm. Also, some of
the tax benefits must be used by the developer. If the developer is small enough, it may
not be able to take advantage of that benefit (Lutton and You, 2017).
One of the advantages of the partnership structure is that there is more flexibility
in the financial performance of the project. If the partnership is based on a target IRR and
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the project produces less than predicted, the switch date can be pushed back to
accommodate the tax investor’s target return (Lutton and You, 2017).
The tax equity flip can be designed using only equity or a combination of equity
and debt. In some cases, the tax equity investor provides financing or a third-party lender
is brought in. Projects with some debt correlate with lower levelized cost of energy rates
(Mendelsohn et al, 2012). However, partnership flips with debt are uncommon. Tax
equity investors are less comfortable with the other partners using project level debt
because the lender will have first lien on the project. In addition, if the project goes into
foreclosure from debt mismanagement the IRS will rescind ITC benefits. If the developer
does use project level debt the tax investor will likely increase its required IRR (Lutton
and Sussman, 2017). The debt servicing comes out of the revenue stream. So, if there is
project debt, paying for debt servicing would affect the developer more than the tax
investor in the beginning while the developer is receiving the majority of the revenue.
Sale Leaseback
The sale leaseback structure uses the tax equity investor as the owner of the
project for the majority of its functional lifetime. The developer builds the array and sells
it to the investor as it is being commissioned. The tax equity investor can then reap the
tax benefits. The investor leases the array back to the developer at a presumably lower
rate based on the ITC and MACRS benefits (Cotter, 2016). The developer has a power
purchase agreement (PPA) with the utility. The majority of its revenue stream comes
from the contract rates (Mendelsohn and Kreycik, 2012). The developer would also
receive benefits from any renewable energy credits that the project generates. The

21
developer is responsible for paying lease fees to the investor regardless of the actual
output and revenue.
This structure has some concrete advantages. The sale leaseback option is simpler
than the other tax equity structures, which means fewer transaction costs. The revenue
streams are distinct and the tax benefits are not shared. The developer does not have to
raise any capital for the project. Also, the structure can be put into place up to 90 days
after the project is built (Lutton and You, 2017). However, the developer must produce
the lease payments regardless of the actual performance of the array. If the developer
intends to buy the array at the end of the lease, the system must be sold at fair market
value and that value must be at least 20% of the original value of the project (Lutton and
You, 2017).
The sale leaseback mechanism can be used to finance many smaller projects
through one partnership. In 2009 Wells Fargo and SunPower Corporation entered into a
$100 million sale lease-back arrangement. Rather than building one large solar array,
they created multiple smaller, distributed projects like the one-megawatt system for the
Western Riverside County Wastewater Authority (PR Newswire, 2009). This example of
financially bundled solar arrays is used primarily for commercial projects, but other
projects styles, like utility scale projects, could use the same financial structure.
Third-Party Ownership with Step-in Rights
The third-party ownership with step-in rights option is similar to a sale leaseback.
However, this structure tends to partner tax equity entities with power providing utilities
rather than with developers. Instead of a lease to contract for the energy sales this
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structure uses a PPA. Written into the contract, the utility retains the right to buy the
project at fair market price at will (Cotter, 2016). The purchase of the array could be any
time after the initial period when the tax benefits are harnessed. It is important that the
agreed price be fair. If it is not the IRS will rescind the tax credits.
Inverted Lease
The Inverted Lease turns the Sale Leaseback structure on its head. The developer
retains ownership of the entire project and receives lease payments from the tax investor.
The tax investor receives all of the distributable cash and the ITC benefits. The developer
may retain ownership of the project after the lease term is up and begin receiving the
distributable cash. In this structure, the developer has a portion of the depreciation
benefits. That may be useful to the developer if it is large enough to be able to use them,
or it may be a net loss for the project if the developer cannot capture the depreciation
benefits (Lutton and You, 2017). This is a relatively uncommon way of setting up a solar
project and there may not be many tax equity investors willing to partner for it because
they access to a smaller percentage of the ITC than other ownership arrangements.
Commercial
Another ownership structure option is for an established commercial business to
build an array. The natural first step would be for a business to build enough solar
capacity to power their activities on site. If they produced excess energy, a portion of it
could be sold back to the utility. The electricity that the commercial entity produces
would first cover its energy load. In this scenario, the utility is essentially buying
electricity from the commercial producer at their retail energy rate. If the business
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produces more electricity than it uses, it can sell it back to the utility up to 10% over the
base load in territories with net energy metering programs (Patel, 2015). Above that
amount, the business would have to meet the requirements for a FIT program if one is
available or independently negotiate a PPA with the utility. While RCEA would treat the
portion of the solar array that satisfies the on-site energy load and the whole sale portions
separately, one large physical system could be constructed at once. That system may be
able to achieve a lower cost of due to economies of scale.
If a mutually beneficial contract could be arranged with RCEA, the commercial
ownership structure would have certain advantages. A large private business would be
able to capture the federal ITC without partnering. Avoiding that set of transaction costs
would put the project at a strong competitive advantage. In addition, a private business is
in the best position to access grant funding and subsidized financing from the USDA
(United States Department of Agriculture, 2017).
Financing Methods

Financing rates are crucial for the economic feasibility of any construction
project. According to a National Renewable Energy Laboratory questionnaire, finance
concerns are the biggest issue for project development according to 52% of respondents
(Mendlesohn and Kreycik, 2012). It can be difficult for solar projects to acquire
reasonably priced financing. Even though solar energy projects produce a consistent
value, usually with a guaranteed revenue stream, some institutions are only willing to
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finance the project at high risk rates (Seif, 2014). This, in conjunction with the high target
IRRs required by tax equity partners, can make funding a solar project challenging.
The key metric for financing is the interest rate. However, there are other factors
which are harder to quantify. Some of the most important qualities for a financial
structure are simplicity, standardization, and speed (Mendelsohn et al, 2012). The
following sources of funding are evaluated on their interest rate ranges, their ease of
procurement and other less tangible qualities (See Table 2).
Table 2. Summary of key elements of the studied financing options.

Interest
Rate
Transaction
Costs
Community
Engagement
Uncertainty

Clean
Renewabl
e Energy
Bonds

Municipal
Bonds

0% - 2%

0.25% 4.04%

High

USDA
Community Project
Subsidize All Equity
Solar
Finance
d Loan
Varies

4% 6.5%

1%

Not
Applicabl
e

High

High

Low

High

Low

High

High

High

Low

Low

Low

High

High

High

Low

High

Low

Clean Renewable Energy Bonds
Clean Renewable Energy Bonds (CREB) are a form of federal tax support for
governmental projects. State, tribal, or local governments and energy cooperatives or
public power providers can issue CREBs to finance renewable energy projects (Kreycik
& Coughlin, 2009).
Theoretically, CREBs allow these organizations to enjoy access to financing
without incurring interest payments. The purchaser of the CREB receives a tax credit
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instead of interest on the loan. However, in some cases the tax credit benefit is not
enough to satisfy investors, so an additional interest rate payment is included. Practically,
the interest rate for a CREB could be as low as 0% and as high as 2% (Kreycik &
Coughlin, 2009). Additional interest rate points may be required if the governmental
organization does not meet the required credit rating. Added interest payments may also
be included if the demand for CREBs is too low (Kreycik & Coughlin, 2009). In addition,
the tax credits are treated as taxable income unlike other tax-exempt bonds (NHA
Advisors, 2015). Even with additional interest payments included to sweeten the pot, this
still provides a relatively cheap way to secure financing (Kreycik & Coughlin, 2009). The
crux of the issue for investors is that the bond issuer’s credit is sufficiently high and that
the tax benefits meet or exceed the interest rates that they would be garnering from
traditional bonds.
Congress authorizes a limited supply of funds for the CREB program. The capital
fund is partitioned into three pools of money available to governments, energy
cooperatives, and public power providers (DSIRE, 2015). The CREBs are awarded on a
first come first served basis. Ten percent of the CREB funds must be used within the first
year that they are allocated, and the remaining must be sunk into the project three years
after the funds were awarded. If the project does not comply with those deadlines and
does not get an extension, the funding will revert to the communal pot to be reissued to
another project (Kreycik & Coughlin, 2009). For some projects, this timeframe can be a
restraining factor adding to the complexity of the endeavor. In addition, the application

26
requires some upfront labor and, likely, legal fees. So, for this mechanism high
transaction costs and a tight time frame must be weighed against a low interest rate.
Municipal Bonds
A municipality can issue a General Obligation bond or a Certificate of
Participation to finance a utility-scale solar array. As a joint powers authority, RCEA can
issue bonds (Cypher and Grinnell, 2007). Municipal bonds have the advantage of
offering relatively low interest rates. As of June 18, 2017, the yield to maturity (YTM),
essentially the interest rate, for a AAA-rated bond is 0.25% to 4.04%. A-rated bonds have
a YTM of 0.77% to 3.90% (Edward Jones, 2017). Interest rates are set for the lifetime of
the bond. One of the attractive qualities of a municipal bond is that income from interest
rates are tax exempt (Investopedia, 2017). While the interest rates are low, investors still
consider municipal bonds attractive due to their low risk reputation.
One consideration is that successfully using a municipal bond to raise funds is
accompanied by transaction costs. For instance, a bond referendum, when voters approve
or disapprove of the issuance of new bonds, would be required. Unfortunately, smaller
projects incur proportionately larger transaction costs than their larger counterparts. For
projects under 10 million dollars, the median transaction costs are 2.31% of the project’s
total cost. This compares with the median transaction cost rate for all bonds of 1.71%
(Joffe, 2015).
Municipal bonds may be a better financing option for a project further out in the
future. CCAs are still a relatively new phenomenon in California. Marin Clean Energy
(MCE), the first CCA in California, is looking forward to using bonds to finance projects,
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but it is waiting for its credit rating to improve over time (DiGiorgio, 2017). Despite the
fact the RCEA has been in existence longer than MCE, the CCA program is significantly
younger. It is likely that the RCEA’s CCA, like MCE, will need to prove its stability and
longevity before earns a favorable credit rating.
Community Solar
Community solar allows energy users to participate in solar generation without
putting panels on their homes. Some entity, which could be a developer, NGO or utility,
owns the solar array and sells shares to interested customers. In some instances, the
members directly own the community solar array (NREL, 2016). Customers may buy
actual panels in a solar array or a share of the electricity produced from the array. Leasing
or special financing are other possible features. Other options allow customers to pay for
their share of the system at time of service like a traditional utility bill.
These programs can be structured in a number of different ways, including virtual
net metering directly on the utility bill, in which the customer’s bill is reduced by the
amount of energy their share of the community solar project produces. The
implementation of community solar varies widely, so there is no standard ownership
model. The community context, such as the affluence of the area, the aggressiveness of
the local environmental goals, and the solar resource, is crucial to the success of the
project.
Nearly three-quarters of the residents in the United States are not able to put
photovoltaic panels on their homes for various reasons including financial or physical
impediments (NREL, 2016). This indicates that there may be a large market for
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community solar. Community solar is a progressive program as well, in that it can give
low-income community members access to savings on energy. Many of the people who
are not able to benefit directly from residential solar are low-income renters. Low-income
community members may not have the capital or credit to put solar on their roofs or may
not own a home. They are, therefore, not able to access the potential financial advantages
of residential solar. In addition, community solar may offer better rates than residential
solar due to economies of scale. A recent NREL study has found that this ownership
structure is growing and forecasts that 32% to 49% of distributed solar in the United
States will come from community solar programs by 2020 (NREL, 2016).
Many of the early community solar programs were started by small governments.
Small governments and municipal utilities are in a position to recognize public demand
for local solar and provide those services (NREL, 2016).
The community solar option does not fit with the other financing methods
because, while it would be increasing local renewable generation in Humboldt County,
RCEA would not be purchasing the power, the community would be. An interesting
feature of community solar programs is that subscribers rarely buy the right to the
renewable energy credits (REC) (NREL, 2016). It seems reasonable that RCEA would
purchase the RECs from another local organization. In this scenario, the renewable
attributes are not technically being double counted, but the satisfaction of environmental
responsibility is being enjoyed by the subscribers and by the electricity utility’s
customers.
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Community solar projects vary widely. Reliable financial data to model this
scenario were not available. The financing rates that community solar projects can access
rely heavily on the structure of the project and the credit worthiness of the institution.
Project Finance
Project finance is a way for a larger company to remove the financing of a
particular project from its balance sheet by creating a new company exclusively for the
project in question (See Figure 6). Unlike corporate finance, the project only has access
to its own cash flow rather than the parent corporation’s funding stream or other projects
associated with the corporation. This can be advantageous because it limits the liability to
the parent company (Pikiel JR, 2015). Project finance appeals to tax equity investors
involved in a partnership flip. This strategy reduces the risk to the tax equity partner by
moving the project off its balance sheet (Groobey et al, 2010).
Lenders are not always interested to work with project finance structures. It is not
in lenders’ interest to enter a situation in which they cannot recoup their assets if a project
fails. However, they can become more amenable to the project with a PPA in place or
some other guaranteed revenue stream. In this case, the utility that is committing to the
PPA lends its credibility to the project, which may result in lower interest rates (Groobey
et al, 2010). Because it is relatively new utility, it is unclear how much weight a PPA
with RCEA would have.
For small utility-scale projects using project finance such as the one this thesis
proposes, interest rates are likely to be between 4% and 6.5% (Hubbell et al, 2012).
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Specifically, for commercial projects, as opposed to utility scale arrays, project finance
interest rates range from 3.25% to 6.85% (Lowder, 2014).
Project financing tends to be used for larger projects. Lenders may not be inclined
to finance a project below $50 million and generally prefer projects in the $100 million
range (Groobey et al, 2010).

Figure 6. Structure of a typical organization using project finance (Groobey et al, 2010).
Subsidized Loan and Grant Funding
There are a number of grants and subsidized loans for solar projects. A prominent
one is the Renewable Energy Systems and Energy Efficiency Improvements Program
Grant offered by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). This funding is
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for agricultural businesses or small businesses in cities with a population of 500,000 or
less (United States Department of Agriculture, 2017). RCEA could not be the entity to
capture the grant because it is not a business. If this mechanism is used in Humboldt
County the most likely scenario involves a subsidized loan and/or grants to a local
commercial business. There are some scenarios in which the grant could be used with a
tax equity flip, but they would require participation by a local business, which would add
an additional layer of complexity to the project.
The USDA grant offers up to $50,000 in cash and a subsidized loan up to $25
million. The loan has a 1% interest rate. The grant application deadline for this year was
March 31, but the subsidized loan applications are continuously accepted (USDA, 2017).
In the quantitative analysis portion of this thesis, the USDA model is based the 1%
interest rate loan without the benefit of the $50,000 grant. This type of subsidized loans is
expected to produce highly cost competitive projects. According to Mendelsohn et al
(2012), PV arrays financed with subsidized loans are expected to financially perform
approximately 20% better than projects with conventional financing.
All Equity
The simplest method of financing a project is 100% equity from the owning
parties. However, all equity project structures, without any outside debt, tend to result in
the highest levelized cost of energy (LCOE) (Mendelsohn et al., 2012). Investors may
require higher IRR target rates when there is project level debt, but the end result still
tends to be lower LCOEs. To develop a project using 100% equity financing, it is
necessary to have the cash on hand at the beginning of the project. Having access to cash
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through debt allows for a more relaxed timeline and puts less pressure on the PPA prices
(Mendelsohn et al., 2012). Most importantly, interest payments are tax deductible, which
helps with after-tax cash flow and creates a more competitive project (National
Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2017c).

33
METHODS

Up until this point, this project has explored the qualitative characteristics of
ownership structures and financing methods for a megawatt-scale solar array in
Humboldt County. This section and the following results section present a quantitative
analysis of many of the previously discussed options. This begins with a discussion of the
tools that I used to create this analysis.
System Advisor Model

The quantitative analysis portion of this project is based on scenarios created with
the System Advisor Model (SAM) program. SAM is a software tool that creates technoeconomic models of renewable energy projects. The National Renewable Energy
Laboratory (NREL) originally created SAM for internal project estimates. In 2007,
NREL released a public version of SAM allowing professionals in the renewable energy
industry, as well as researchers, to analyze the potential economic and design concerns of
projects. The program is regularly updated to provide a broader and more detailed
analysis (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2017c). The financial structures on
which this thesis relies were added in a recent update.
SAM has tailored models for different renewable energy projects. This thesis
exclusively worked with the photovoltaic (PV) models. Within the PV models, SAM
provides different ownership and financial models for analysis. SAM offers models
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tailored to residential, commercial, third party ownership, PPA-single owner, PPApartnership flip with and without debt, and PPA-sale leaseback projects (National
Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2017c).
Fixed Costs

The SAM program uses data inputs to create production and economic forecasts.
SAM comes with default data set in the inputs. However, these inputs are from a study
based on 100-megawatt solar arrays from Fu et al. (2016). For this project, I replaced the
default data with data from the same Fu et al. (2016) study but based on a one-megawatt
commercial array (See Table 3). NREL estimated the costs for a one-megawatt array to
be $2.03/installed watt (Fu et al, 2016).
The NREL study, which estimated the cost per installed watt, was published in
2016 but the data were gathered in 2015. The cost of solar is decreasing significantly, so
it is important to estimate the likely decline in costs for future projects to improve the
accuracy of the model. In order to get an estimate for 2018 fixed costs, I used three
different studies with forecasts of fixed PV costs. The first study predicted that the cost
per installed watt of solar will drop 10% per year (Farmer and Lafond, 2016). The second
study expects costs to drop by 5% per year (Tsuchida et al, 2015). For the third, I used
the study’s estimate for cost per installed watt in 2018 (International Finance
Corporation, 2015). I adjusted NREL’s $2.03/installed watt figure to reflect the two first
studies’ forecasts for 2018. Then, I averaged the three forecasts together and came to
$1.50/installed watt for a one-megawatt array in the United States (See Table 3).
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Table 3. Cost Analysis for the national installed per-watt price for solar PV from different
studies in 2018.
Installed $/W
(NREL,2015)
Cost Estimate for 2018
Average ($/W)

$ 2.03
Study 1
Study 2
Study 3

$1.48
$1.74
$1.27
$1.50

In order to better approximate costs in Humboldt County, I used a construction
data estimation tool, RSMeans (RSMeans, 2016). It is a tool that some in the construction
industry use to estimate timelines and labor materials costs for projects. RSMeans
provides region specific multipliers to more accurately model construction costs. The
2016 RSMeans text assesses materials costs in Eureka, CA to be 103.9% of the national
average and installation costs to be 118.3% of the national average (RSMeans, 2016).
Based on the proportions in SAM’s model, 93% of the fixed costs were materials and 7%
were installation expenses (See Table 4). I multiplied the materials portion of the fixed
costs by the corresponding RSMeans multiplier and gave the installation portion the same
treatment. I applied these multipliers to the averaged $1.50/installed watt cost and arrived
at $1.57/installed watt for a one-megawatt solar array in Humboldt County in 2018.
Table 4. Fixed cost analysis for a one-megawatt PV array in Humboldt in 2018.

Installation Costs
Materials Costs
Final ($/W)

SAM’s Cost
Ratio
.07
0.93

RSmeans
Multipliers
1.18
1.04

Cost
$0.13
$1.44
$1.57
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Other Costs

One of the options that SAM provides is to use NREL’s PVWatts program for a
streamlined technological analysis. This relatively simple design tool is sufficient for the
purpose of this analysis. The available solar data for the Humboldt County region are
from the Arcata Airport. SAM uses typical meteorological year (TMY) data from the
Arcata Airport to estimate resource availability for the rest of the analysis. This analysis
uses the TMY3 data set because it is based on more recent data (NREL, 2005). This is a
relatively conservative estimate considering that there are areas of Humboldt County with
better solar resource than the airport, and it is reasonable that a developer would select
land with solar resource in mind.
Many of the costs relating to financing the project are common to all the
scenarios. The corporate tax rate for California is 8.84%, and SAM uses a federal income
tax rate of 35% (Tax-rates.org, 2017). The real discount rate is set at 5.5% with a 2.5%
inflation rate. The annual insurance rate is 0.5% of the total cost of the project. All of the
projects, regardless of their financing methods, include additional construction period
loans. There is an upfront fee of 1% of the principal, and an assumed 4% annual interest
rate.
Incentives

For projects beginning in 2018, the ITC is still set at 30% of the installed cost of
the project. According to the current schedule, in 2018 the bonus MACRS will have
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already begun its decline and must be reduced to a depreciation of 40% of the assets of
the project in the first year (Lutton and You, 2017).
The models that employ a tax equity partnership require a cost for acquiring
financing including equity closing costs and a 3% development fee. The equity closing
costs refer to the transaction costs involved with securing the tax equity partnership. The
models that include a variable interest rate also include $450,000 in debt closing costs.
NREL based these transactions costs on estimates for a 16.7-megawatt array. Therefore,
these default transaction costs may be too large for this project’s one-megawatt array. On
the other hand, transaction costs to legally construct a tax equity partnership appear to be
substantial regardless of the size of the array (Mendelsohn et al, 2012). So, these same
transaction costs will be applied to the significantly smaller array, but a sensitivity
analysis will be conducted on this variable to better understand the effect it has on the
economic outcomes of the project.
A hypothetical one-megawatt array was selected because scheduling with the
California Independent System Operator (CAISO) begins at that capacity. Scheduling
with CAISO incurs a flat initial fee and additional fees based on capacity size. The onemegawatt size, or slightly below that capacity, avoids those costs and allows projects to
be more financially feasible (California Independent System Operator, n.d.).
SAM Parameter Assumptions

SAM includes system design options, such as module type, orientation and
system losses, to more accurately describe the functionality of the solar array and produce
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more realistic production outputs. While it is important that the generation estimates be
reasonable for an array in Humboldt County, this analysis is more focused on the effect
that the ownership and financial structures will have on the economic outcomes. For that
reason, all the various scenarios will use SAM’s standard system design parameters.
SAM Ownership Models

NREL’s SAM program provides nine ownership models from which to build. Of
those nine, I selected single owner, partnership flip with and without debt, and sale
leaseback as models for this analysis.
Single Owner
The single owner model is the simplest ownership structure. SAM uses a project
finance model to demonstrate single party ownership. The parent company creates a
project company to manage the solar array (See Figure 7). The single owner may or may
not have the advantage of being able to fully capture tax benefits. All the tax benefits and
distributable cash go back to the parent company (Mendelsohn et al., 2012). The SAM
model assumes a target IRR of 11% to be reached in 20 years, the lifetime of the project
(National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2017c). This model includes a $450,000 fee for
closing costs and an upfront fee of 2.75% of the total debt. Unlike some of the other
structures, this model does not have a set cost for acquiring financing because it does not
employ a partnership flip.
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Figure 7. Flow chart for benefits and responsibilities in a Single Owner project over its
lifetime (Mendelsohn et al, 2012).

This structure was included to represent a scenario in which RCEA decided to
own the project despite not being able to use ITC benefits. It is unlikely that the
organization would choose this structure, because there are other options that could
produce energy more cheaply, unless it were the only way to access a financing source or
grant funds (R. Engel, personal communication, September 15, 2017).

40
Partnership Flip Structures
A tax equity partnership flip can be structured in many ways. The SAM model
differentiates partnership flips in which the project uses outside debt and projects that are
fully internally financed.
All Equity
A partnership flip with an All Equity model assumes a target IRR of 9% to be
reached in nine years. This model has lower target IRR because the tax equity partner
would not have to compete with a lender for assets in case the project founders. The
target IRR is the tax investor’s inducement to partner with the developer, therefore
creating the appropriate returns in a timely manner is crucial. These assumptions are
based on NREL’s research into the solar industry’s use of financing structures
(Mendelsohn et al, 2012).
Figure 8 shows the partnership flip structure for an All Equity arrangement. The
figure indicates the percentages of the revenue that each partner receives before the flip
as the first number in the output boxes. The second number is what they receive after the
scheduled flip. The tax equity partner invests slightly more of the equity and receives
almost all the tax benefits initially. The developer receives all the “distributable cash”;
i.e. the revenue from the PPA minus the operating costs. After the flip, the developer
receives a little more of the tax benefits, but still the minority of the payout. At that point,
the tax investor gets all of the distributable cash. In the final stage, the developer takes
back a small percentage of the distributable cash. This model is simply an example of one
of the ways that partnership flips can be structured. The All Equity scenario includes
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$300,000 for the equity closing costs but does not include any debt closing costs like the
financed options.

Figure 8. Flow chart for benefits and responsibilities in a Partnership Flip project with all
equity over its lifetime (Mendelsohn et al., 2012).

Leveraged. The Leveraged Partnership Flip is structured largely the same as the
All Equity option. However, the tax investor contributes nearly all the equity. In this
option, the debt-to-equity ratio is based on a 1.3 debt-service coverage ratio (DSCR).
This ratio is designed so that the project always has enough cash on hand for debt serving
and operations and maintenance. The target IRR for the leveraged flip is slightly higher,
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at 11%, to be reached in nine years (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2017c). The
tax investor requires a higher target IRR because the lender has first rights to the assets of
the project should anything go wrong (Mendelsohn et al., 2012).
The distributable cash is the revenue from the PPA minus operating expenses and
debt serving (See Figure 9). Unlike the All Equity model, the developer starts with a
nominal share of the distributable cash and then starts taking in the majority of it when
the target IRR is reached. Likewise, almost all the tax benefits go to the tax investor until
the flip, when the percentages essentially swap. This model includes both transaction
costs: $300,000 for equity closing costs and $450,000 for debt closing costs (National
Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2017c).
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Figure 9. Flow chart for benefits and responsibilities in a Partnership Flip project with
debt over its lifetime (Mendelsohn et al, 2012).
Sale Leaseback
In a Sale Leaseback, the revenue streams are fully separate. The tax investor takes
in all the tax benefits. The developer receives the distributable cash and pays the lease
(See Figure 10). In this model, the two actors are less financially connected, but the tax
equity investor still has a 9% IRR target for 20 years. However, both parties are invested
in the success of the project; the lease payments are designed so that there will always be
enough cash on hand for operations and maintenance and debt servicing (Mendelsohn et
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al, 2012). This model includes $300,000 for the cost of acquiring financing but no debt
closing costs. SAM’s Sale Leaseback model does not include the ability specify financing
rates. It assumes that the tax investor buys the entire project and then begins leasing it
back to the developer. However, it is possible for the tax equity investor to finance the
cost of the project. Including project spanning debt could improve the LCOE, like in
other ownership models, by spreading the upfront costs over the lifetime of the project.
There is debt for the construction period, like the other models, but this is calculated as an
all equity scenario. Due to that constraint, there is only one, all equity, set of outputs for
this model.
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Figure 10. Flow chart for benefits and responsibilities in a Sale Leaseback project over its
lifetime (Mendelsohn et al., 2012).
Commercial
SAM has a Commercial model; however, the specifics of this model are outside
of the scope of this project. The Commercial model requires detailed information about a
business’ electrical load. In order to approximate the commercial option, I used the
Single Ownership model and included the ITC and depreciation benefits. This
configuration will not be as accurate as using the Commercial model, but without a
specific business in mind, the inputs would be purely guesswork. The results from this
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project’s Commercial model will likely be higher than the reality of a commercial project
because this model does not account for retail priced energy savings.
This project imagines a scenario in which a portion of the on-site generation goes
towards the company’s operating load, and a portion is sold to RCEA. The company
would have the advantage of reducing their cost of energy and potentially making a profit
from the sale of excess energy. However, this dual-purpose generation is too complicated
for this analysis to model. So, the Commercial model will proceed as if it only includes
the capacity destined to be sold to RCEA.
Interest Rates
This analysis treats financing options and their key characteristics, like interest
rate, as if they were independent variables. In reality, the type of ownership structure
used for a project would have a significant effect on the terms of the available financing.
There are a number of variables that inform the interest rate that a given project can
secure. To address that issue high and low interest scenarios were included for financing
options over a range of interest rates (See Table 5). The terms and interest rates included
in this project reflect the industry standard for average projects. However, some unusual
ownership structures may require interest rates and terms above the modeled rates to
compensate financiers for greater risk.
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Table 5. Definitions for high and low interest rates for financing options with established
ranges (Kreycik & Coughlin, 2009; Edward Jones, n.d.; Hubbell et al., 2012;
Lowder, 2014; USDA, 2017; Mendelsohn et al., 2012).
Financing Method
CREB
Municipal Bond
Project Finance
Project Finance (Commercial)

Low
0%
0.25%
4%
3.25%

High
2%
4.04%
6.50%
6.85%

SAM Output Metrics
Given a complete set of input data, SAM produces a number of performance
metrics about an array’s energy generation over the lifetime of the project. Using those
estimations SAM is able to approximate values for the respective financial metrics. SAM
provides the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) and subsequent PPA rate. Both of these
metrics are given in nominal and real prices. I have chosen to use real rates for the LCOE
and PPA metrics to compare the different project structures. The real prices reflect
inflation and give a better sense of costs over the life of long-term projects.
Sensitivity Analysis

The SAM program provides a parametric function for the user to input multiple
values into the model and view the results in the form of different metrics. This creates an
opportunity to run multiple sensitivity analyses to determine how project economics vary
as key inputs change. This function allows the user to better understand the relationship
of inputs to outputs.
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Transaction Costs
Since transaction costs are unknown, I have included a sensitivity analysis of that
element of the fixed costs. While transaction costs are not directly proportional to the size
of the project, it is reasonable to hypothesize that a significantly smaller project would
have smaller fees associated with creating the legal structure of a tax equity partnership
and securing financing. So, this analysis seeks to understand what effect differing
transaction costs would have on the LCOE of the project. To understand the relationship
between the transaction costs and the LCOE, I ran the model with the transaction costs at
10% increments from 50% to 120% of the original figures. SAM’s standard values
include $300,000 for the default equity closing costs associated with creating a tax equity
partnership, and $450,000 in debt closing costs. All the four ownership structures
considered in this analysis involve debt closing costs. Only the Partnership Flip and Sale
Leaseback structures have equity closing costs that come from setting up a tax equity
partnership.
It is highly likely that transaction costs for acquiring financing would vary across
the different financing methods. It is difficult to estimate concrete figures for the specific
scenarios. It is possible that the transaction costs could be larger than the baseline figures
compiled by NREL due to the rural nature of Humboldt County. However, considering
how much smaller this project is than projects that these figures are based on, it seems
unlikely that transaction costs would increase past NREL’s estimations. For those
reasons, I included estimates for transaction costs that are higher than the original
estimates but only up to 20% higher.
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The All Equity scenario does not require any transaction costs for acquiring
financing. The Single Owner model and Commercial model do not use a tax equity
partnership, which means that they also do not incur transaction costs, and those scenario
combinations are not included in this analysis.
Feed-in Tariff
While FIT programs are losing popularity in the energy procurement industry,
RCEA indicated an interest in exploring the possibility of creating such a program in
their founding documents (Warren, 2016; RCEA, 2016). To address that original interest,
this project will examine the feasibility of the SAM generated projects entering into a FIT
structure. The PPA rates, generated for each project scenario by SAM, will be compared
to SCP’s existing FIT program. SCP’s FIT program includes a base rate and additions for
desirable characteristics, like building on a previously used site or using local labor.
These rate increases will be considered in the analysis.
Location
Another key consideration for the economic viability of a solar array is location.
While the scope of this project encompassed Humboldt County and zeroed in on the
Arcata/Eureka Airport for weather data, it is reasonable to consider the possibility of
other, nearby locations. With that in mind, the Crescent City Airport and Redding Airport
were selected to get a sense for the economic viability of a similar project in nearby
counties. It is approximately 150 miles from the Arcata Airport to the Redding Airport
and 70 miles to the Crescent City Airport (GoogleMaps, 2017). The LCOE values for
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similar projects in those two locations were calculated to compare to rates in Humboldt
County.
To generate a more accurate estimate, I used RSmeans to estimate the initial costs
for a project in Redding. I used the initial cost estimate, that was previously calculated,
and substituted the materials and installation multipliers for Redding. With those
modifications the cost per installed watt in Redding, $1.69, is slightly higher than the cost
per installed watt for Eureka, $1.75. RSmeans does not have cost multipliers for Crescent
City. For the purpose of this analysis, the cost of materials and installation in Crescent
City is assumed to be the same as in Eureka. This is a generous assumption for Crescent
City because that area is more remote than Eureka and would likely have higher costs for
both installation and materials.
Time of Construction
While RCEA has expressed an interest in procuring local solar energy by 2018,
there is a real possibility that the project will not start as planned. Even if the initial five
megawatts of local solar are begun by 2018, RCEA has a mandate to continue expanding
local solar production in the near term (Redwood Coast Energy Authority, 2016). So, this
analysis included a comparison of the same projects starting in different years. If the
construction phase is pushed back to 2020, the ITC benefits will decrease to 26% of the
cost of the project. Then in 2021, the ITC benefits will diminish to 22%. To address this,
the LCOE was determined for the same project in 2020 and 2021.
To get a more accurate estimate, the fixed costs were also adjusted to the forecast
of the corresponding year. The same process was used to estimate the fixed costs for
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2020 and 2021. However, one of the three forecasts used for the original calculation only
extends to 2019. This estimate is, therefore, an average of two forecasts rather than three
(See Tables 6,7, 8, & 9). The forecast that did not include 2020 and 2021 was the lowest
estimate of the three. So, the fixed cost estimates for 2020 and 2021 are more expensive
than the 2018 estimate on which the majority of this project’s analysis is based. These
estimates are applicable to future projects in addition to near-term projects that are
postponed.
Table 6. The analysis for the fixed cost component using historic costs adjusted by future
predictions for 2020.
Installed $/W (NREL, 2015)
Cost estimate for 2020 ($/W)
Average ($/W)

Study 1
Study 2

$2.03
$1.20
$1.57
$1.38

In Table 6, the generic fixed costs for the United States in 2020 are established.
Then, in Table 7 the 2020 fixed costs are adjusted for Humboldt County prices.
Table 7. Fixed costs for 2020 adjusted for Humboldt County prices.
Installation Costs
Materials Costs
Final ($/W)

SAM's Cost Ratio
0.07
0.93

RSmeans Multipliers
1.18
1.04

Cost
$0.12
$1.33
$1.45

Table 8. The analysis for the fixed cost component using historic costs adjusted by future
predictions for 2021.
Installed $/W (NREL 2015)
Cost estimate for 2021 ($/W)
Average ($/W)

Study 1
Study 2

$2.03
$1.08
$1.49
$1.29
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Table 8 demonstrates the methods for arriving at national generic fixed cost rate
for 2021. In Table 9 the generic fixed costs are modified for the economic context of
Humboldt County.
Table 9. Fixed costs for 2021 adjusted for Humboldt County prices.
Installation Costs
Materials Costs
Final ($/W)

SAM's Cost Ratio
0.07

RSmeans Multipliers
1.18

Cost
$0.11

0.93

1.04

$1.24
$1.35

Target Internal Rate of Return Variation
The estimates for the target IRRs of the tax equity partner, or the owner in the
case of the Single Owner model and Commercial model, come from NREL data
(Mendelsohn et al., 2012). That information, in turn, was gathered from industry insiders.
It is reasonable that there is some range in target IRR rates that these large entities
require. Another sensitivity test was applied to the target IRR rate to determine what
effect variance in that variable would have on the LCOE. To those ends, the LCOE was
calculated using a target IRR plus and minus one percentage point from the original data.
The spread was kept relatively tight because the tax equity partners have a significant
amount of leverage in negotiating the partnership agreement, and it is unlikely that they
would allow the target IRR to deviate much from their ideal. The different ownership
models include base target IRRs specific to their circumstances. The subsequent
sensitivity analysis will test a range of target IRRs based on the original target IRR rather
than a generic spread of rates.
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Grant Funding
The original baseline modeling for the USDA subsidized loan financing scenario
included the 1% interest rate but not the $50,000 grant offered through the same program.
This grant was not included in the models originally because the two benefits are not
always awarded to the same project. However, it is possible for the same project to
receive both. So, included in the results of this project will be calculation of the LCOE
for the USDA Subsidized Loan financing options that includes the $50,000 grant. This
grant money would be applied to the fixed costs of the project. To achieve that decrease
in the fixed costs, the installed cost per watt was reduced from $1.5700/watt to
$1.5284/watt. This produced a difference of $49,920.25. While the change in the installed
cost per watt does not result in a perfect representation of the USDA grant funding, the
precision is close enough to indicate the effect of the treatment.
ITC vs. Low Interest Rate
One of the key concerns for considering building a solar array, is the reasonable
possibility that one project may not be able to capture the ITC and low interest rate at the
same time. So, the question is which factor has more bearing on the economic viability of
the project? To answer that question, I generated nine data points for the LCOE, using
interest rates between 0% and 8%, for the Single Owner, Commercial, and Partnership
Flip ownership models. The Single Owner model represents a project without the ITC,
and the Commercial and Partnership Flip models represent projects with ITC benefits.
That data were plotted to create three lines for comparison.
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RESULTS

The results section begins with a presentation of the calculated LCOE values from all
the ownership structures and financing options modeled in this analysis. This information
is followed by the results of the sensitivity analyses described above.
Overview

The analysis of the results from the SAM modeling program began with a simple
comparison of the LCOE and PPA outputs to rank the various ownership
structure/financial model scenarios. The baseline models produced a wide range of LCOE
and PPA outputs. The LCOE results varied from ¢9.36/kWh to ¢17.26/kWh. The
Partnership Flip Ownership Structure produced scenarios with the two cheapest LCOEs
(See Table 10). In general, the Partnership Flip Structure performed the best; its average
LCOE, across the eight financing options, was ¢11.03/kWh, slightly cheaper than the
average for the Commercial model, ¢11.11/kWh (See Table 11 & 12). The Partnership
Flip and Commercial Structures were close contenders, dominating the cheapest half of
the results between the two of them. Unsurprisingly, the Single Ownership Structure
without the benefit of the ITC produced a higher average LCOE, ¢12.95/kWh (See Table
13).
The Sale Leaseback Ownership Structure resulted in the most expensive average
LCOE at ¢13.50/kWh. However, those results are misleading; the average is exclusively
created from the only Sale Leaseback output available. The SAM Sale Leaseback model
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only allows for the All Equity scenario. Including debt tends to reduce the LCOE of a
project by spreading the large upfront costs over the lifetime of the project. It is likely
that, given the ability to use financing, this ownership structure would have performed
better. The Sale Leaseback structure resulted in lower LCOE than the All Equity
Partnership Flip option. This suggests the possibility that a Sale Leaseback project with
even midrange financing could contend with some of the more feasible ownership
structure and financing combinations.
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Table 10. List of all the ownership structure and financing options in order of lowest
LCOE.
Ranking

Structures

Financing

LCOE
(¢/kWh)

PPA
(¢/kWh)

1

Partnership flip

CREB Low

9.36

9.83

2
3
4

Partnership flip
Commercial
Partnership flip

Municipal Bond Low
USDA Loan
USDA Loan

9.49
9.77
9.80

9.99
10.25
10.37

5

Commercial

Project Finance Low

9.89

10.48

6

Partnership flip

CREB High

10.22

10.93

7

Single Owner

CREB Low

10.81

11.36

8

Single Owner

Municipal Bond Low

10.95

11.52

9

Partnership flip

11.19

11.90

10

Partnership flip

11.30

12.30

11

Single Owner

Project Finance Low
Municipal Bond
High
USDA Loan

11.38

11.99

12
13

Commercial
Single Owner

Project Finance High
CREB High

11.47
11.97

12.21
12.63

14
15
16

Partnership flip
Single Owner
Commercial

12.49
13.20
13.20

13.45
13.99
15.24

17

Single Owner

13.24

14.01

18
19
20
21

Sale Leaseback
Partnership flip
Single Owner
Single Owner

Project Finance High
Project Finance Low
All Equity
Municipal Bond
High
All Equity
All Equity
Project Finance High
All Equity

13.50
14.31
14.82
17.26

14.45
16.05
15.76
19.87

It is remarkable how much more expensive the All Equity Single Owner scenario
is than the other options. It is nearly ¢3 more than its closest contender and nearly double
the lowest scenario (See Table 10). The Single Owner structure does not require any of
the transaction costs associated with a tax equity structure, and the All Equity option does
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not require any transaction costs from acquiring financing. This option has some of the
lowest costs and yet the other factors at play make it the worst economic option. This fits
with Mendelsohn et al.’s prediction that having debt correlates with lower LCOE. Those
authors expected including project level debt to reduce the LCOE by 20% to 50% as
compared to All Equity scenarios. Counterintuitively, paying for the entire project in cash
makes the project more expensive per kilowatt-hour. This is due to the time value of
money concept; despite having to pay for debt servicing, not having to put up all the cash
for initial costs makes projects with debt cheaper than All Equity projects.
Table 11. LCOE results and averages of Partnership Flip options.
Ownership Structure
Partnership flip
Partnership flip
Partnership flip
Partnership flip
Partnership flip
Partnership flip
Partnership flip
Partnership flip

Financing Option
CREB (Low)
Municipal Bond (Low)
USDA Loan
CREB (High)
Project Finance (Low)
Municipal Bond (High)
Project Finance (High)
All Equity
Average

LCOE (¢/kWh)
9.36
9.49
9.80
10.27
11.19
11.30
12.49
14.31
11.03

Table 12. LCOE results and averages of Single Owner options.
Ownership Structure

Single Owner
Single Owner
Single Owner
Single Owner
Single Owner
Single Owner
Single Owner
Single Owner

Financing Option
CREB (Low)
Municipal Bond (Low)
USDA Loan
CREB (High)
Project Finance (Low)
Municipal Bond (High)
Project Finance (High)
All Equity
Average

LCOE (¢/kWh)

10.81
10.95
11.38
11.97
13.20
13.24
14.82
17.26
12.95
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Table 13. LCOE results and averages of Commercial options.
Ownership Structure

Commercial
Commercial
Commercial
Commercial

Financing Option
USDA Loan
Project Finance (Low)
Project Finance (High)
All Equity
Average

LCOE (¢/kWh)

9.77
9.89
11.47
13.32
11.11

Table 14. LCOE results and averages of Sale Leaseback options.
Ownership Structure

Sale Leaseback

Financing Option
All Equity
Average

LCOE (¢/kWh)

13.50
13.50

ITC vs Interest Rate

While it is certainly the ideal scenario, a low interest rate and ITC benefits may
not be achieved in one project. Figure 11 plots out how the Single Owner, Partnership
Flip and Commercial ownership structure models perform over an interest rate range of
0% to 8%. The Single Owner model was designed to illustrate the LCOE of the PV
project without the ITC, and that is what it represents in this graph. The Partnership Flip
and Commercial models are two different ways of structuring the ownership of a solar
array while collecting the ITC. They both represent the LCOE potential over a spectrum
of interest rates.
In Figure 11, the lower black line illustrates the lowest price the Single Owner
model reaches, ¢10.81/kWh (See Appendix A). The model without the ITC cannot
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compete with a model that manages to capture it where the Commercial and Partnership
Flip lines are below the black line. If a solar project with a structure that can capture the
ITC can also secure an interest rate between 0% and approximately 3.4%, no structure
without the ITC could compete with it. Ultimately, the only way for a structure that does
not capture the ITC to be competitive is that it locks in a low interest rate and the other
potential ITC capturing project cannot.
In Figure 11, the higher black line shows the most expensive a project with the
ITC could be, given this spread of interest rates, approximately ¢13.30/kWh. Between the
two black lines is where the projects could be competitive, given differing interest rates.
If a project without the ITC procured financing between 0% and approximately 4.2%
interest rate, it could have a chance to compete with a project that obtained the ITC, if it
were between approximately 3.4% and 8%. For example, a Single Owner project with an
interest rate of 1% without the ITC would produce a LCOE of ¢11.38/kWh, outcompeting a Commercial project that can only obtain financing at 7%, resulting in a
¢12.7/kWh LCOE. However, it is doubtful that such a comparison would be useful as an
evaluative tool since it is unlikely that a project with a LCOE of ¢11.38/kWh could be
considered.
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Figure 11. The LCOE of three ownership structures graphed over a range of interest rates.
The bottom black horizontal line represents the lowest LCOE that the Single
Owner could be. The higher black horizontal line is the highest LCOE that the
Partnership Flip and Commercial structures could be in this example.

Another remarkable feature from Figure 11 is the similarity between the
Partnership Flip and Commercial models’ trendlines. In fact, the Single Owner and
Commercial ownership models were built using the same base model and yet the
Commercial model trendline is much more correlated with the Partnership Flip trendline.
This indicates that acquiring ITC benefits is a determining factor in the economic
viability of a solar project.
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The Partnership Flip and Commercial model LCOE trend lines in Figure 11 are
nearly on top of each other, but the Partnership Flip line is slightly more expensive. This
may be due to the transaction costs required of a multiparty business venture. The
Partnership Flip trendline has a steeper slope indicating that is becoming more expensive
faster than the Commercial model’s trendline.
Considering that the Partnership Flip and Commercial model lines represent
ownership structures that can use the ITC and the Single Owner line cannot, it is
remarkable how close similar they are. The Single Owner line is certainly not 30% higher
than the other two lines. While the ITC is a powerful determinant of the economic
viability of a project, other ongoing costs like operations and maintenance, debt servicing
and transaction costs obscure the 30% discount. The ITC is 30% of the upfront costs but
the upfront costs themselves are only a portion of the lifecycle costs of the project.
Transaction Costs

To learn about the effect of transaction costs on the overall economic viability of
a solar array, I found the LCOE of all the ownership structure and financing option
scenarios with differing percentages of the default costs (See Table 15).
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Table 15. SAM’s default values for transaction costs are incrementally shifted as inputs
for the models.
% of Default Value

Debt Closing Costs

Equity Closing Costs

50%
60%
70%
80%
90%

$225,000
$270,000
$315,000
$360,000
$405,000

$150,000
$180,000
$210,000
$240,000
$270,000

First, we will examine the results of the sensitivity analysis on the Single Owner
model. The Single Owner model incurs debt closing costs but does not have to pay the
equity closing costs because it does not have a tax equity arrangement. The results from
the sensitivity analysis show a marginal increase in the LCOE with each 10% increase in
transaction costs (See Table 16).
Table 16. Results of the transaction cost sensitivity analysis on the Single Owner model
LCOE in ¢/kWh, including the difference between the results of the least and
most expensive scenarios.
Municipal
Project Municipal Project
CREB
USDA CREB
% of Default Value
Bond
Finance Bond Finance
Low
Loan High
Low
Low
High
High
50%
10.17
10.3
10.69 11.23 12.34
12.37
13.81
60%
10.3
10.43 10.83 11.37 12.52
12.54
14.01
70%
10.42
10.56 10.97 11.52 12.69
12.71
14.21
80%
10.56
10.69 11.11 11.67 12.86
12.88
14.41
90%
10.68
10.82 11.24 11.82 13.03
13.06
14.62
100%
10.81
10.95 11.38 11.97 13.2
13.23
14.82
110%
10.94
11.08 11.52 12.12 13.38
13.4
15.02
120%
11.07
11.21 11.66 12.27 13.55
13.58
15.22
Change
between
0.9
0.91
0.97 1.04
1.21
1.21
1.41
50% and
120%
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The effect of the transaction cost percentage change is linear, but it varies
between financing options (See Figure 12). The lines of the more expensive financing
options have a slightly steeper slope than the more competitive scenarios. As is shown in
Table 16, the change between the lowest transaction costs and the highest increases with
the more expensive financing options. This effect is most notable for the higher interest
rate Project Finance option.

Figure 12. Results of the Single Owner model transaction cost sensitivity analysis
graphically represented.
The transaction costs modeled for the Single Owner structure start at $225,000
and end with $540,000, making a $315,000 range of costs. Given $1,884,000 in fixed
costs, the range of costs studied is about 16% of the amount of the project. The change in
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the LCOE from incrementally increasing transaction costs is a smaller percentage of the
LCOE, between 8% and 10%. This indicates that the Single Owner model is not very
sensitive to the change in transaction costs.
The Partnership Flip model includes equity closing costs in addition to the debt
closing costs due to the expense of creating a legally binding relationship. The equity
closing costs are about a third as large as the expense of securing debt, but it is still
substantial (See Table 15).
Due to the increased total transaction costs, as compared to the Single Owner
model, it is unsurprising that the change in the LCOE between 50% and 120% of the
baseline is higher than with the previous model. However, it is not significantly higher.
The baseline transaction costs went from $450,000 to $750,000, increasing by 67%,
while the LCOE only increased by 12% to 14% (See Table 17). This further indicates the
insensitivity of the LCOE in these projects to transaction costs.
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Table 17. Results of the transaction cost sensitivity analysis on the Partnership Flip model
LCOE in ¢/kWh, including the difference between the results of the least and
most expensive scenarios.
Project
Project
CREB Municipal USDA CREB
Municipal
% of Default Value
Finance
Finance
Low Bond Low Loan High
Bond High
Low
High
50%
8.59
8.75
8.97
9.37 10.21
10.32
11.34
60%
8.73
8.9
9.13
9.54 10.41
10.51
11.57
70%
8.88
9.05
9.28
9.71
10.6
10.71
11.8
80%
9.02
9.19
9.44
9.88
10.8
10.91
12.03
90%
9.17
9.34
9.6 10.05 10.99
11.1
12.26
100%
9.31
9.49
9.75 10.22 11.19
11.3
12.49
110%
9.45
9.63
9.91 10.38 11.38
11.49
12.72
120%
9.6
9.78
10.06 10.55 11.58
11.69
12.95
Change
between
1.01
1.03
1.09
1.18
1.37
1.37
1.61
50% and
120%

Like the Single Owner model, the Partnership Flip model results indicate higher
sensitivity to changes in the transaction costs with the more expensive financing methods.
The most expensive option in this analysis, Project Finance High, has the steepest slope,
indicating that it is the most sensitive to shifts in the initial costs. (See Figure 13).
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Figure 13. Results of the Partnership Flip model transaction cost sensitivity analysis
graphically represented in ¢/kWh.
Like the Single Owner model, the Commercial model only incurs debt closing
costs and not equity closing costs. The Commercial model has the advantage of being
able to exploit the ITC without having to use costly tax equity structures. For this reason,
the LCOE is lower than the Single Owner model across all the financing options. As
expected, the difference in the LCOE due to the change of the transaction cost baseline
by 50% to 120% is less than the corresponding change in the Single Owner model (See
Tables 16 and 18).
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Table 18. Results of the transaction cost sensitivity analysis on the Commercial model
LCOE in ¢/kWh, including the difference between the results of the least and
most expensive scenarios.
Project
USDA
CREB
% of Default Value
Finance
Loan
High
Low
50%
9.23
9.34
10.78
60%
9.34
9.45
10.91
70%
9.44
9.56
11.05
80%
9.55
9.67
11.19
90%
9.66
9.78
11.33
100%
9.77
9.89
11.47
110%
9.88
10
11.61
120%
9.99
10.11
11.75
Change
between
0.76
0.77
0.97
50% and
120%

The differences in the LCOE results between Single Owner, Partnership Flip and
Commercial models and between the LCOEs of the financing options within the
Ownership models indicate that the economics of solar projects are more sensitive to
transaction costs the more expensive they become. However, the effect is relatively weak
throughout all the examples. Within the bounds of this analysis, changing the amount of
the transaction costs does not have a large effect on the competitiveness of the project
and that result appears to be consistent across the different ownership structure and
financing option combinations.

68
Feed-in Tariff

While RCEA does not currently have a FIT program, they expressed an interest in
developing one in the near future (Redwood Coast Energy Authority, 2016). In order to
approximate how successful the modeled solar arrays would be in a FIT, the FIT rates
from SCP’s ProFIT program were used for comparison. The base rate for ProFIT is 9.5
¢/kWh. Including additional incentives, a 250-kW array on a brown field, using local
labor with training incentives could potentially earn 13 ¢/kWh (Sonoma Clean Power,
2017). The PV arrays in this analysis would only be able to receive 12.5 ¢/kWh of the 13
¢/kWh because their capacity is too large to take advantage of one of the additional
incentives. In the following figures, the PPA rates are compared to SCP’s ProFIT rates to
estimate if the modeled projects could be financially feasible in a FIT program.
Figure 14 shows the PPA results from the Single Owner model without any tax
incentives. This model includes the scenarios with the highest LCOE and PPA rates of all
the models. None of these financing methods in combination with the Single Owner
model has a low enough PPA rate to be financially feasible under a FIT program, such as
ProFIT, at its base level. Half of the financing method scenarios could enter into the
ProFIT program at 12.5 ¢/kWh, the high incentive rate. However, some of the
requirements for the incentives, like building on previously used land, could increase the
LCOE, moving it above the 12.5 ¢/kWh line. The lowest three PPA rates are far enough
below the ProFIT with incentives line to enable them to afford to sell at the FIT program
price even if the project costs increased modestly.
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Figure 14. PPA rates for the Single Ownership with no tax based incentives ownership
structures comparted to SCP’s FIT rates in ¢/kWh.
As in the Single Owner model, the Partnership Flip model did not result in any
scenarios in which the PPA rate is equal to or less than the baseline ProFIT rate (See
Figure 15). The low estimate for CREB, which is based on a 0% interest rate, produced
the closest at 9.83 ¢/kWh. The majority of the financing scenarios would be financially
feasible with some or all of the additional incentives to boost the FIT rate.
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Figure 15. PPA rates for the Partnership Flip ownership structure model comparted to
SCP’s FIT rates.
The PPA results from the Commercial ownership structure model are comparable
to the Partnership results; none of the financing scenarios create PPA rates that are lower
or equal to the ProFIT base rate (See Figure 16). Given one or two of the additional
incentive rate increases, three-quarters of the scenarios could be economically feasible.
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Figure 16. PPA rates for the Commercial ownership structure model comparted to SCP’s
FIT rates.
The Sale Leaseback model data, represented in Figure 19, display a particularly
expensive way to generate energy compared to the other ownership structures. At
¢14.45/kWh, the All Equity Sale Leaseback option could not be reasonably enrolled in
the ProFIT program in the base rate or even with all of the additional incentive rate
increases. However, the SAM program only provides the option to model an All Equity
financing scenario. In all four of the modeled ownership structures, the All Equity option
is the most expensive. So, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the Sale Leaseback model
would look better given other financing modeling options. In fact, of the four ownership
structures, the All Equity scenario in the Sale Leaseback model is the cheapest. So, it is
possible that this option might result in the best PPA rate if the more advantageous
financing scenarios were applied.
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Table 19. PPA rates for the Sale Leaseback ownership structure model comparted to
SCP’s FIT rates in ¢/kWh.
PPA Rate
14.45

FIT Rate
9.50

FIT Rate + Incentives
12.50

This analysis is intended to give a sense of how the results of these models stack
up next to existing programs. It is important to remember that PPA rates are negotiable
and not simply a product of the LCOE. The relationship that SAM provides between the
LCOE and the PPA is an estimate based on the market average (SAM, 2017). If a project
were to be based on one of the scenarios with a PPA rate slightly above the given FIT
rate, it could choose to tighten the developer’s returns and produce energy with slimmer
margins.
Location

The location of the array, and the subsequent level of solar resource the array
captures, has a large effect on the economic viability of a PV project. In Figure 17, the
Arcata Airport project, which this thesis is based around, is compared to identical
projects in Redding, CA and Crescent City, CA. Of the three locations, the Arcata project
is clearly the most expensive across all the ownership structure and financing option
combinations. The project located at the Crescent City Airport is slightly cheaper than in
Arcata, and the project in Redding is the most competitive location.
It is unsurprising that Redding is the better location for a PV array. Redding is
located inland and somewhat south of Mckinleyville, where the Arcata/Eureka Airport is
situated (Googlemaps, 2017) (See Figure 18). However, the Crescent City airport is north
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of both of those locations and also along the coast. So, it is remarkable that the Crescent
City project would be less expensive than the Humboldt County project. According to
SAM, the Crescent City airport receives marginally more solar irradiance than the
Arcata/Eureka airport and, therefore, a PV array sited there would produce more energy
at a slightly cheaper rate. This difference could indicate what an undesirable site the
Arcata/Eureka Airport is for solar generation and signal that this location is a bad
indicator of solar resource for other parts of the County.

Figure 17. Results of the location sensitivity analysis for Arcata, Crescent City, and
Redding across all the ownership structure and financing option scenarios in
¢/kWh.
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Figure 18. Solar Radiation Map of California. Adapted from the National Renewable
Laboratory (NREL, 2017b)
Time of Construction

This project sought to approximate what effect delaying the start date would have
on the lifetime economics of the array. The three most important considerations were the
decrease in ITC benefits, the elimination of the MACRS bonus depreciation, and
declining solar fixed costs. The relationship between those three factors provided
interesting results. Predictions for the utility scale solar energy market expect prices to
continue to decline, but the results of this analysis suggest that there will be bumps in the
declining trend line (See Figure 19).
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Figure 19. Plot of the expected cost of utility-scale PV solar energy through 2050 with
estimates based on low, midrange and high levels of technological advancement
(National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2017a).

While the Sale Leaseback scenario does not have many data points to make
conclusive arguments, the results of the sensitivity analysis point to a remarkable
relationship between the tax benefits and falling PV installation costs over time. In 2018,
the LCOE benefits from the full ITC and a 40% MACRS depreciation incentive while
also having the most expensive cost per installed watt; this results in the lowest LCOE of
the three years studied (See Figure 20). In 2020, the installed cost per watt declines, the
ITC rate drops and the MACRS depreciation benefit evaporates. This combination of
factors produces the most expensive LCOE of the three studied years. The next year, as
the ITC continues its slow decline and the price of solar hardware and installation
continues to drop, the LCOE begins to decrease again.

76
It appears that between 2018 and 2020 losing the MACRS was the determining
variable causing the LCOE to increase. As the impact of losing the MACRS depreciation
benefit wanes after 2020, the steady decline in the price per installed watt becomes the
dominant variable, driving down the LCOE.

Figure 20. The LCOE for the Sale Leaseback ownership structure in 2018, 2020 and 2021
in ¢/kWh.

The Partnership Flip ownership model produced similar results to the Sale
Leaseback model throughout the three studied years (See Figure 21). Losing the MACRS
tax benefits in 2020, causes the LCOE to increase dramatically in all the financing
scenarios. Then, between 2020 and 2021, the decline of the ITC benefits is at a much
gentler rate than the decrease in the cost per installed watt, and the LCOE becomes more
competitive again. This pattern can be observed across all the financing option scenarios.
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Figure 21. The LCOE for the Partnership Flip ownership structure in 2018, 2020 and
2021.
The Commercial model does not follow the same results pattern as the previous
two ownership models (See Table 20). Despite losing the MACRS depreciation, the
USDA Loan and All Equity scenarios both produce lower LCOEs in 2020 and 2021 than
in 2018. The other two financing options, the high and low estimates for Project Finance,
both follow the established pattern of a steep increase in the LCOE after losing the
MACRS benefits in 2020 and then a slight decrease in the LCOE in 2021 as the cheaper
cost per watt drags down the total.
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Table 20. The LCOE for the Commercial Model from 2018 to 2021 in ¢/kWh.
Financing Option
USDA Loan
Project Finance Low
Project Finance High
All Equity

2018
9.77
9.89
11.47
13.20

2020
9.73
9.97
11.59
13.19

2021
9.62
9.92
11.53
12.97

LCOE Change
-0.15
0.03
0.06
-0.23

Unsurprisingly, the Single Ownership model demonstrated the greatest decrease
in the LCOE over time. In this model, the developer does not capture the ITC, so the
passage of time only decreases the fixed costs and does not remove any advantages. Once
again, the decrease in LCOE is not evenly distributed among the various financing
scenarios. This sensitivity analysis demonstrates a clear trend of the LCOE decreasing
more rapidly in the more expensive scenarios (See Table 21). While the more expensive
options become cheaper at a steeper rate than the more economic options, it does not
make the most expensive options competitive, at least over this time frame.
Table 21. A comparison of the LCOE for the Single Ownership model with no tax
incentives over the years 2018, 2020 and 2021 in ¢/kWh.
Change
Financing Option
2018
2020
2021
from ’18
to ‘21
CREB Low
10.81
10.34
9.96
0.85
Municipal Bond Low
10.95
10.48
10.08
0.87
USDA Loan
11.38
10.88
10.46
0.92
CREB High
11.97
11.44
11.00
0.97
Project Finance Low
13.20
12.59
12.08
1.12
Municipal Bond High
13.24
12.62
12.10
1.14
Project Finance High
14.82
14.11
13.50
1.32
All Equity
17.26
16.22
15.36
1.90

Grant Funding
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The grant funding portion of the USDA’s Rural Energy for America program was
not originally included in the calculation for the USDA Subsidized Loan financing
option. Decreasing the project’s fixed costs by approximately $50,000 resulted in small
shifts in the LCOE (See Table 22). In the three ownership structure models with USDA
Subsidized Loan options, the change in the LCOE after reducing the fixed costs was
around 1%. It is worth noting that the various ownership structures produced differing
reductions in the LCOE due to the grant funding but they were similarly small. On the
other hand, $50,000 is approaching 3% of the total original fixed costs of the project. So,
the decrease in fixed costs from a grant produces a reduction approximately one-third as
large as the original reduction in the LCOE of a project.
Table 22. LCOE for the Subsidized Loan financing option with and without grant funding
in ¢/kWh.
Original
LCOE:
LCOE
LCOE %
Ownership Structure
Treatment $50,000
Decrease Decrease
LCOE
Grant
Single Owner
11.38
11.22
0.16
1.4%
Partnership Flip
9.75
9.68
0.07
0.7%
Commercial
9.77
9.64
0.13
1.3%
Grant Funding %
2.7%
of Total Fixed Costs

Target Internal Rate of Return Variation

Overall, adjusting the target IRR by increasing and decreasing the rate by one
percentage point from the base line made a very small difference in most cases (See
Table 23 & 24). On the upper end, decreasing the target IRR by one had the effect of
reducing the LCOE by approximately ¢1/kwh in the case of the Partnership Flip model
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with Municipal Bond (High) financing. The largest change in the LCOE from increasing
the target IRR was a 0.83 ¢/kwh increase in the All Equity version of the Partnership Flip
structure.
Table 23. Summary of the change in the LCOE as the target IRR increases by one
percentage point for all the financing and ownership structure combinations in
¢/kWh.
Change in
LCOE
Ownership
LCOE Base
LCOE with
Financing Method
Target IRR
Structures
Target IRR
+1% Target
+1%
IRR
Single Owner
CREB (Low)
10.81
10.8
-0.01
Single Owner Municipal Bond (Low)
10.95
10.94
-0.01
Single Owner
USDA Loan
11.38
11.38
0
Single Owner
CREB (High)
11.97
11.97
0
Single Owner Project Finance (Low)
13.2
13.21
0.01
Municipal Bond
Single Owner
13.24
13.24
0
(High)
Single Owner Project Finance (High)
14.82
14.85
0.03
Single Owner
All Equity
9.36
9.34
-0.02
Partnership Flip
CREB (Low)
9.49
9.47
-0.02
Partnership Flip Municipal Bond (Low)
9.8
9.79
-0.01
Partnership Flip
USDA Loan
10.22
10.26
0.04
Partnership Flip
CREB (High)
11.19
11.79
0.6
Partnership Flip Project Finance (Low)
11.3
11.3
0
Municipal Bond
Partnership Flip
12.49
12.51
0.02
(High)
Partnership Flip Project Finance (High)
14.31
15.14
0.83
Partnership Flip
All Equity
9.36
9.34
-0.02
Sale Leaseback
All Equity
13.5
13.87
0.37
Commercial
USDA Loan
9.77
9.63
-0.14
Commercial Project Finance (Low)
9.89
9.89
0
Commercial Project Finance (High)
11.47
11.5
0.03
Commercial
All Equity
13.2
13.69
0.49
Total Average
0.13
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Table 24. Summary of the change in the LCOE as the target IRR decreases by one
percentage point for all the financing and ownership structure combinations in
¢/kWh.
LCOE
Change in
LCOE
Ownership
Base
LCOE with
Financing Method
Target IRR
Structures
Target
-1% Target
-1%
IRR
IRR
Single Owner
CREB (Low)
10.81
10.82
0.01
Single Owner
Municipal Bond (Low)
10.95
10.96
0.01
Single Owner
USDA Loan
11.38
11.39
0.01
Single Owner
CREB (High)
11.97
11.97
0
Single Owner
Project Finance (Low)
13.2
13.2
0
Single Owner
Municipal Bond (High)
13.24
13.22
-0.02
Single Owner
Project Finance (High)
14.82
14.79
-0.03
Single Owner
All Equity
17.26
16.78
-0.48
Partnership Flip
CREB (Low)
9.36
9.37
0.01
Partnership Flip Municipal Bond (Low)
9.49
9.5
0.01
Partnership Flip
USDA Loan
9.8
9.81
0.01
Partnership Flip
CREB (High)
10.22
10.27
0.05
Partnership Flip
Project Finance (Low)
11.19
11.19
0
Partnership Flip Municipal Bond (High)
11.3
10.29
-1.01
Partnership Flip Project Finance (High)
12.49
12.46
-0.03
Partnership Flip
All Equity
14.31
13.58
-0.73
Sale Leaseback
All Equity
13.5
13.14
-0.36
Commercial
USDA Loan
9.77
9.64
-0.13
Commercial
Project Finance (Low)
9.89
9.89
0
Commercial
Project Finance (High)
11.47
11.44
-0.03
Commercial
All Equity
13.2
12.96
-0.24
Total Average
-0.14

The data in Tables 23 and 24 suggest that the effect of both increasing or
decreasing the target IRR changes depending on the interest rate of the project in
question. Lowering the target IRR increased the LCOE for the scenarios with the lowest
interest rates in the Single Owner structure and the Partnership Flip structure (See Figure
22). What is remarkable is that these two structures are two of the most dissimilar of the
four ownership structures. The Commercial structure does not fit the pattern of the
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previous two, considering that the LCOE of the USDA Loan scenario, which boasts a
very low interest rate, decreased as the target IRR was lowered. The Sale Leaseback
structure does not have an interest rate and so cannot be considered for the pattern.

Figure 22. Results of increasing the target IRR by one percentage point across all the
financing options in the Partnership Flip ownership structure.
By definition, the All Equity scenarios do not have interest rates that would
interplay with the change in target IRR. However, in this analysis the All Equity
scenarios seem to act like the higher interest rate financing options. As noted previously,
the All Equity financing option produces the most expensive energy of all the scenarios.
Perhaps the change in LCOE as produced by the shift of the target IRR is not dictated by
the interest rate but some other factor that affects the LCOE.
Ultimately, the data suggest that modestly changing the target IRR of a project
will not have a predictable effect. This appears to be a positive for a small entity
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negotiating with a large tax equity partner. The tax equity investor has a strong incentive
to secure a high target IRR. Considering these results, the smaller partner would likely
have every reason to cooperate and focus the negotiation on some other aspect that will
have a great effect on the long-term success of the project. However, as the results of
changing the target IRR do not seem to follow a predictable pattern, they should be
modelled before any new policies are set for a real understanding of the chosen change’s
implications.
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CONCLUSION

In support of RCEA’s goal to contract five megawatts of local solar by the end of
2018, this project has examined the possible ownership structures and finance sources for
a one-megawatt array in Humboldt County. There are a number of possible combinations
of those two variables, which are investigated in this analysis. Many of the combinations
of financing and ownership structure were modeled using the SAM program. Possible
variations of those projects were also modeled, using the parametrics function of SAM, to
better understand the relationship between different variables and the economic viability
of the project as a whole.
The scenarios that are able to take advantage of the ITC are clearly more
economically feasible even than projects with no debt servicing costs. There is no interest
rate low enough for a project without tax incentives to compete with a project that can
capture those benefits. Despite that fact, financing is still a crucial factor in the viability
of a project.
Regardless of the ownership structure, using financing is a better approach than
relying on equity from the controlling company exclusively. This was stressed in much of
the literature and the modeled results bore out the same conclusion. The All Equity
financing scenario was the most expensive across all the ownership structures.
The location of the solar array is a key determining factor for the economic
outcome of the project. The analysis of location was constrained by only having solar
irradiance data from a single site in Humboldt County. It is likely that there are other
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locations in Humboldt County with more plentiful solar resource that would reduce the
cost of producing energy. The data from the SAM model suggest that choosing a sunny
location, even in the neighboring counties, may be a reasonable option in service of an
affordable LCOE. Building a PV array in a neighboring county may be less politically
tenable for RCEA but if the installation work was done by a local company it could still
retain enough of the vestiges of local solar.
The target IRR that a tax equity partner requires is not a strong determinant of the
economic viability of a project. So, if a project is working with a tax equity partner, that
may be a good place to acquiesce to their demands and negotiate more vehemently on
other points. According to the SAM results, transaction costs do appear to contribute to
the LCOE, but they are not a defining variable in the way that location and the MACRS
depreciation incentive seemed to be. Solar projects appear to be more sensitive to
transaction costs the larger they become, but it is still not a defining feature of the project.
Together, the transaction cost and target IRR variables could change the competitiveness
of a project, but there is some room to be flexible with those variables.
The two lowest cost scenarios were tax equity partnership flips that would require
access to government financing, the CREB and the Municipal Bonds. This analysis could
not accurately capture the increase in transaction costs from accessing these two forms of
financing. As demonstrated in the transaction cost sensitivity analysis, those increased
costs may not make the projects infeasible, but it could increase their LCOEs.
A commercial project that accesses USDA subsidized financing resulted in the
third lowest LCOE in the analysis. It is possible that this would be the lowest cost option
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for building solar capacity in Humboldt County. Determining which industries could
benefit from the ITC of a multi-million-dollar project would be the next step in assessing
if this approach could bear fruit in Humboldt County.
The timeframe for starting a project will play a crucial role in the economic
viability of any proposed solar array. A project initialized by the end of 2018 will have
the benefit the MACRS depreciation and the full ITC, which is a crucial advantage. The
cost of the hardware and installing solar has decreased rapidly and is expected to continue
on this trend, but the results of this analysis suggest that the declining cost per installed
watt will not make up for the tax incentives tapering out for some years. In addition, price
forecasting, like any kind of prediction, becomes more dubious the farther out the
projection. So, it could make sense for RCEA to contract for the first five megawatts of
solar as soon as possible, then focus on other local sources of renewable energy, until
towards the end of the five-year period to encourage the next ten megawatts of solar.
Solar energy generation in Humboldt County must contend with a number of
challenges. While it may remain more expensive than energy from solar arrays in sunnier
parts of the state, there are reasonable options for RCEA to satisfy its goal of contracting
for five megawatts of local solar by 2018 and catalyzing the utility scale solar industry in
the Humboldt County.
Recommendations for Future Research

Bundling smaller projects together is a useful tool in accessing tax benefits
through a tax equity flip and thus minimizing transaction costs. In the case that RCEA

87
wants to own a solar project, bundling it with other small projects in a large-scale tax
equity partnership flip, while using subsidized financing like CREBs, could result in the
most feasible LCOE. Unfortunately, a bundled ownership structure was outside of the
scope of the SAM model and therefore is not considered here. Modeling a set of bundled
projects would be an excellent next step for further research.
I attempted to run a sensitivity analysis on the capacity of the system, testing the
economies of scale, but this model does not have the nuance to investigate that facet of
the project. Exploring the effect that size would have on a similar project in Humboldt
County could be very informative and useful.
Based on the literature, Community Solar seems like a good fit for the culture of
Humboldt County. Unfortunately, the unique structure of a Community Solar project
could not be modeled with the SAM program. Further research could examine the
economic viability of a Community Solar array using more malleable modeling software.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A. The tables included in Appendix A contain data from the results of the
analysis.
Table A.1 LCOE for three different ownership structures with interest rates between zero
and eight percent in ¢/kWh.
Single Owner
Partnership
Commercial
%
(No ITC)
Flip (ITC)
(ITC)
0
10.81
9.36
9.32
1
11.38
9.8
9.77
2
11.97
10.27
10.23
3
12.58
10.75
10.71
4
13.2
11.25
11.19
5
13.84
11.76
11.69
6
14.49
12.29
12.19
7
15.15
12.83
12.7
8
15.81
13.39
13.23
Table A.2 LCOE for the Single Owner model with FIT rates in ¢/kWh.

Financing Method
CREB Low
Municipal Bond Low
USDA Subsidized
Loan
CREB High
Project Finance Low
Municipal Bond High
Project Finance High
All Equity

PPA
Rate

FIT
Rate

11.36
11.52

9.5
9.5

FiT Rate
+
Incentives
12.5
12.5

11.99

9.5

12.5

12.63
13.99
14.01
15.76
19.87

9.5
9.5
9.5
9.5
9.5

12.5
12.5
12.5
12.5
12.5
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Table A.3 LCOE for the Partnership Flip model with FIT rates in ¢/kWh.

Financing Method
CREB Low
Municipal Bond Low
USDA Subsidized
Loan
CREB High
Project Finance Low
Municipal Bond High
Project Finance High
All Equity

PPA
Rate

FIT
Rate

9.83
9.99

9.5
9.5

FiT Rate
+
Incentives
12.5
12.5

10.37

9.5

12.5

10.93
11.9
12.3
13.45
16.05

9.5
9.5
9.5
9.5
9.5

12.5
12.5
12.5
12.5
12.5

Table A.4 LCOE for the Commercial model with FIT rates in ¢/kWh.
Financing Method

PPA
Rate

FIT
Rate

USDA Subsidized
Loan
Project Finance
Low
Project Finance
High
All Equity

10.25

9.5

FiT Rate
+
Incentives
12.5

10.48

9.5

12.5

12.21

9.5

12.5

15.24

9.5

12.5

95
Table A.5 LCOE for Arcata, Crescent City, and Redding in ¢/kWh.
Crescent
Ownership Structure
Arcata
Redding
City
Single Owner
9.36
9.08
8.14
Single Owner
9.49
9.21
8.26
Single Owner
9.77
9.35
8.38
Single Owner
9.80
9.51
8.52
Single Owner
9.89
9.60
8.60
Single Owner
10.22
9.97
8.93
Single Owner
10.81
10.49
9.40
Single Owner
10.95
10.63
9.52
Partnership flip
11.19
10.85
9.72
Partnership flip
11.30
10.97
9.82
Partnership flip
11.38
11.05
9.90
Partnership flip
11.47
11.13
9.97
Partnership flip
11.97
11.62
10.41
Partnership flip
12.49
12.12
10.86
Partnership flip
13.20
12.81
11.48
Partnership flip
13.20
12.84
11.50
Sale Leaseback
13.24
12.93
11.58
Commercial
13.50
13.10
11.74
Commercial
14.31
13.89
12.44
Commercial
14.82
14.38
12.89
Commercial
17.26
16.75
15.00

